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Abstract
Due to the tradition of ‘Nordic openness’, and intensified by international trends, the norm 
of policy-making transparency is strong in Finland. Inspired by organizational institutional-
ism, the present article studies what this notion of transparency means in practice. A case 
study of a social security reform committee is presented. The consensus-building practices 
typical of Finnish corporatist policy-making significantly constrained the transparency of 
government communication during the lifetime of the committee. The government com-
municated actively in public to meet the demand for transparency; but in order to secure 
effective bargaining, the government communicated issues concerning the committee so 
vaguely that it did not inspire wide public discussion. Public discussion was instead mainly 
fuelled by leaks. These findings suggest that a strong norm of transparency can lead to 
ceremonial transparency, where government public communication is loosely coupled with 
policy-making practices. These ceremonies might strengthen the notion of Nordic openness.
Keywords: Nordic openness, transparency, government communication, policy-making, 
corporatism, Finland
Introduction
Nordic countries are famous for their tradition of openness. The reputation of “Nordic 
openness” is based, among other things1, on the strong emphasis on transparency of 
government activities in these countries (e.g., see Erkkilä 2012). During recent decades, 
the norm of transparency has strengthened even further in Nordic countries, reflecting 
an international trend: Increasingly critical citizens have been making demands for bet-
ter citizen participation in policy-making (e.g., Dalton et al. 2003: 1-3). Meeting these 
demands requires proactive and transparent government communication concerning 
policy intentions and options (cf. Meijer et al. 2012: 14). Moreover, the news media have 
become more critical of political elites, they too demanding transparency (Esser 2013). 
The present article studies what this norm of government transparency means in 
practice in Finland. The article thus contributes to the literature on government com-
munication, where there is a need to clarify the concrete meaning and significance of 
“watchwords” like transparency (Sanders 2011: 268). Earlier research suggests that the 
policy-making institutions and practices of Finnish consensus democracy (see Lijphart 
2012) might put a special twist on how the Finnish government meets the demand for 
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transparency. In Finnish consensus democracy, policy-making often involves bargain-
ing in tight elite networks. Earlier research suggests that bargaining is usually more 
efficient and effective when the public and the media are excluded from the process 
(e.g., Reunanen et al. 2010). 
Against this background, I look at how government communication in Finland has 
adapted to the strengthened norm of transparency: Is the content of policy preparation 
processes actively communicated to the public and how? How do the policy-making 
institutions typical of Finnish consensus democracy limit the transparency of government 
communication? How does the government solve the contradiction between the norm 
of transparency and the “realpolitik” of secrecy? The present article approaches these 
questions through the lens of organizational institutionalism. This theoretical tradition 
offers tools for understanding how organizations cope with normative demands coming 
from their social environment when those demands collide with internal demands for 
efficiency (Meyer & Rowan 1977). 
The analysis is based on a case study of government communication in a corporatist2 
policy-making process: the SATA committee (2007-2009). This committee was assigned 
by the government of Finland to draft a major reform of the social security system. As 
a corporatist bargain between the government parties, the trade unions and the employ-
ers’ federations, it is a prime example of policy-making based on the imperative to 
build consensus and seek compromises. Moreover, the demand for transparency was 
particularly strong due to the societal significance of the policy issues and the enormous 
scope of the committee’s task. It is therefore a good case for studying the possible ten-
sions between the norm of transparency and the need for secrecy. The aim of this case 
study is not to generalize, but to build theory and to understand “deeper causes” (see 
Flyvbjerg 2006: 229). 
The Norm of Transparency of Policy-making in Finland
The strong norm of transparency in the Nordic countries is reflected in the early enact-
ment of Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation in these countries. Finland enacted its 
first information access law as early as 1951 (Erkkilä 2012: 5). This act did not, however, 
put much emphasis on the transparency of policy preparation (Mäenpää 2006: 58-59). 
Enactment of the new FOI act in 1999 marked a change in this respect (Mäenpää 2006: 
64-66). One of the objectives of this act is to promote citizen participation in policy-
making (Openness Act 1999: Chapter 1, Section 3; see also Constitution of Finland 1999: 
Section 14). In contrast to the old act, which prescribed a passive approach to transpar-
ency where information was given only when asked for, the new act emphasizes proactive 
transparency: civil servants have a duty to make available and share information and, 
thus, to promote citizen participation (see Hynninen 2000: 35-37, 40). Moreover, the 
Recommendation on Central Government Communication emphasizes the importance of 
promoting public discussion and citizen participation in policy preparation (Prime Min-
ister’s Office 2002: 6). This goal should be achieved, for instance, by briefing the news 
media about unfinished policy preparation processes (Prime Minister’s Office 2002: 15). 
In sum, the legislation and recommendations reflect a norm of proactive transparency: 
The government is expected to inform citizens about on-going policy-making processes 
in order to enable public discussion and citizen participation in policy-making. 
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Citizens and the media, too, have increasingly demanded transparency. Due to 
political de-alignment, rising levels of education, the individualization of society and 
geopolitical changes, from the 1980s onwards the citizens of Finland have increasingly 
expected transparency and accountability from the political elite. This can be seen, for 
instance, in the rising number of scandals targeting political elites. (Kantola & Vesa 
2013.) At the same time, journalists began to take a more distanced and critical position 
vis-à-vis the political and financial elites (Aula 1991; Kantola 2013). This development, 
which is a sign of the general mediatization of politics, has resulted in journalism that 
more actively demands transparency from political elites (cf. Esser 2013: 156, 170). 
Public opinion now strongly supports proactive transparency in policy preparation: For 
instance, 83 per cent of Finns agree that “it should be made easier for people to par-
ticipate in and discuss important political decisions” (Bengtsson & Christensen 2012: 
261, my translation). This attitude is in line with a widespread trend in established de-
mocracies: Citizens have become dissatisfied with representative democracy and want 
to participate more directly in policy-making (e.g., Dalton et al. 2003: 1-3). Members 
of the Finnish elite also widely share the normative ideal that policy preparation should 
be transparent and based on broad-based public discussion (Ruostetsaari 2014: 212).
Public Communication and Policy-Making  
in a Consensus Democracy
However, at the same time the Finnish political system contains elements that do not 
necessarily favour transparent government communication. Finland is, to a great degree, 
a consensus democracy (Lijphart 2012): Finnish governments are typically surplus multi-
party coalitions and the number of effective parties is high. Moreover, while corporatism 
(see Lijphart 2012: 158-173) has generally declined in Finland, it is still present in some 
policy sectors (e.g., pension and social security policy), where major interest organiza-
tions have a strong and institutionalized position in policy preparation. Due to their 
emphasis on “inclusiveness, bargaining and compromise”, consensus democracies can 
also be called “negotiation democracies” (Lijphart 2012: 2). In Finland, policy-making 
often involves intensive bargaining and negotiations among the coalition parties and 
between the government parties and major interest organizations. 
Earlier research suggests that bargaining is usually more effective when the media 
and the public can be excluded from the process. This is, first of all, because public-
ity encourages posturing and thus tends to fix bargaining positions (Kantola 2002: 
287; Spörer-Wagner & Marcinkowksi 2010: 8-9). Policy-makers therefore often pre-
fer secrecy during the policy preparation stage in order to facilitate compromise and 
consensus-building (Reunanen et al. 2010: 295; Spörer-Wagner & Marcinkowksi 2010: 
9). For this reason, policy-makers in consensus democracies do not usually try to gain 
leverage in the bargaining process by “going public” (cf. Roncarolo 2002: 76; Kriesi 
2004: 202-203; see Kernell 1997), that is, by trying to gain public support for their own 
policy preferences during the course of the bargaining process. 
Moreover, the Finnish political elite is small and cohesive, and informal and personal-
level contacts among the elite have traditionally played a major role in the building of 
elite-level consensus (Ruostetsaari 2007; Reunanen et al. 2010). Because these tight 
elite networks provide an efficient means of communication, the elites often do not need 
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media publicity to discuss policy issues with each other (Reunanen et al. 2010: 304; 
Ruostetsaari 2007: 187; see also Koch-Baumgarten & Voltmer 2010: 222). Thus, the 
news media do not have a similar visible role in governing in Finland like they do in, 
for instance, the United States, where “face-to-face communication has become more 
difficult with the growing reach of government, the increasing number of participants 
and the dispersion and confusion of power and authority” (Cook 1998: 125).
The paradox, therefore, is that while the Finnish government faces strong normative 
demands to practice transparent public communication concerning policies in prepara-
tion, it has, at the same time, strong incentives to pursue secrecy in order to maintain 
efficiency in policy-making (see also Spörer & Marcinkowski 2010). I expect that the 
Finnish government might respond to this paradox by loosely coupling (Meyer & Rowan 
1977; see also Lowrey & Ezrikova 2010) its public communication with actual policy 
preparation practices. 
The Concept of Loose Coupling
The concept of loose coupling captures one way in which organizations sometimes 
adapt to normative demands coming from their social environment. Organizations’ 
social environments include various institutionalized rules, which are typifications and 
expectations concerning how legitimate organizations should behave. These rules are 
often supported by law or public opinion. Organizations often do not fully adapt to 
these institutionalized rules, because doing so would in many cases lead to inefficiency. 
However, organizations need to take these institutionalized rules into account somehow 
in order to maintain and increase their legitimacy. (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 341, 347.) 
As argued originally by John Meyer and Brian Rowan (1977), organizations often solve 
this dilemma through loose coupling, that is, through a “slackening of bonds” within the 
organization (Lowrey & Erzikova 2010: 278). Loose coupling occurs when organizations 
adapt to the institutionalized rules only superficially: Organizations meet the normative 
demands coming from their environment by adopting new practices or renewing their 
formal structure, but these practices or structures do not have a firm connection to the 
core practices of the organizations, which remain unchanged (and efficient). Therefore 
the “adoption of organizational forms and practices can become ceremonial, independent 
of their functionality” (Lowrey & Erzikova 2010: 278, my emphasis).3 This ceremonial 
activity has merely “ritual significance: it maintains appearances and validates an or-
ganization” (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 355). 
It seems likely that the Finnish government might solve the dilemma of the simultane-
ous strong norm of transparency and the need for secrecy through a loose coupling of 
public communication and policy-making. As shown, the transparency of policy-making 
is an institutionalized rule that is to an increasing degree supported by law and public 
opinion. The government most likely wants to adapt to this institutionalized rule of 
transparency in order to strengthen its legitimacy. As Jenny De Fine Licht et al. (2014: 
112) write, public officials share “a widespread perception that openness increases the 
perceived legitimacy of the decision making.” But because extensive transparency might 
hamper efficient consensus-building, it is possible that the government’s public com-
munications sometimes adapt to the norm of transparency only ceremonially, that is, by 
giving only the appearance of transparency and, thus, being loosely coupled with actual 
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policy preparation practices. This loose coupling of public government communication 
and policy-making thus means that these two activities would, to a certain degree (but 
not fully), be disconnected from each other. Earlier research on government commu-
nication indeed suggests that this is a possible scenario: Government communication 
activities can become “mere window-dressing exercises to give the appearance of open 
government communication” (Sanders & Canel 2013: 311).
The Case, Data and Method 
The present article examines the transparency of government communication by analys-
ing a case study of a corporatist policy preparation committee. Because the government 
parties and major interest groups were represented in the committee, it is likely that pub-
lic communication between the major policy-makers did not play an important role in the 
policy preparation process. However, it is interesting to study whether the government 
still practiced active public communication in order to meet the demand for transparency. 
Moreover, it is interesting to explore whether the nature of the reform, as a corporat-
ist bargain, limited the transparency of government communication and whether the 
government’s public communication was loosely coupled with the bargaining process. 
The SATA committee (2007-2009) was assigned by the “Bourgeois government” (2007-
2011, including the Centre Party, the National Coalition Party, the Greens of Finland, the 
Swedish People’s Party) to reform the social security system of Finland. The committee 
was a corporatist bargain between the government parties, the employers’ organizations 
and the trade unions (Saari 2009: 245). The committee and its subdivisions had around 
60 members, including civil servants, ministers’ political advisers, interest groups (espe-
cially labour market organizations) and civic organizations. The SATA committee finally 
reached consensus on dozens of proposals for changes in social security legislation. Its 
most expensive proposals included abolishment of employers’ universal social insurance 
payments4, a reduction in municipal taxes and setting a minimum level for pensions. 
The case was studied by triangulating observations with many types of data: in-
terviews, the government’s public communication material and newspaper articles. 
In total, 20 interviews with 13 members of the SATA committee and two government 
communication officers were conducted between November 2011 and January 2013 
and in January 2014 (in three waves).5 The public communication material includes 
the government’s press releases and PowerPoint presentations used at the committee’s 
press briefings. Articles about the committee (including news articles, editorials, com-
mentary, and letters to editor) from July 2007 to December 2009 were collected from 
the electronic archives of major newspapers: Aamulehti6, Helsingin Sanomat and Kes-
kisuomalainen. These papers used to be affiliated with political parties, but nowadays 
they are considered to be quite neutral in a party-political sense, at least when covering 
national-level politics. In addition, some observations were made and facts checked on 
the basis of earlier studies on the SATA committee (Pulkkinen 2011; Saari 2009, 2011).
The data were analysed to find out how actively and in what way the government 
informed the media and the public about the SATA committee during its work; how and 
to what extent these government communication activities were visible in the media and 
to what extent they inspired public discussion; and how the interviewees assessed the 
significance of public discussion and of the government’s official public communication 
134
Nordicom Review 36 (2015) 2
activities. The analysis focuses on the period from June 2007 to January 2009. Between 
these dates, the committee’s politically most significant and most expensive decisions 
were agreed upon, and the political significance of the committee was reduced to a 
considerable degree after this period (see Saari 2011: 88).
Findings
Active Government Communication
The government’s official public communication of the committee’s work was quite 
active. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the Prime Minister’s Office organ-
ized many press meetings and press conferences concerning the committee during its 
work (see Table 1). In these press events, the chairman of the committee (a retired civil 
servant), the Minister of Social Affairs and Health and occasionally the Prime Minister 
told journalists about the committee’s work and the issues it was working on. The social 
security reform was also the topic of some government press releases. Moreover, the 
ministry published a brochure about the reform committee. There were also dozens of 
semi-public7 seminars and other events where the civil servants on the committee talked 
about its work to a broad spectrum of stakeholders (e.g., civic organizations and other 
people who were not committee members). 
Table 1. Major Public Communication Events Related to the SATA Committee
 Month Events
 11/2007 Press meeting
 5/2008 Press conference
 8/2009 Press meeting
 11/2008 Leak of memo; Press meeting
 1/2009 Leak of draft interim report; Press conference (interim report)
 4/2009 Press meeting
 10/2009 Press meeting
 12/2009 Press conference (final report)
Loose Coupling of Public Communication and Policy-making
Although official government communication was active, its impact on public discussion 
was limited. In spite of the communication activities, there was not much public discus-
sion about the committee in the media during the first year of the committee (Figure 1; 
Pulkkinen 2011: 37).8 For instance, the committee and the government arranged press 
briefings in November 2007, May 2008, and August 2008 (Table 1), but the amount of 
news coverage remained at a low level during these months (Pulkkinen 2011: 37). The 
newspapers wrote a few news articles on the basis of some of the government’s com-
munication activities, but these articles did not often lead to many follow-up stories or 
commentaries. As one interviewed committee member said, “it was visible nowhere” 
that the press briefings were held. The lack of public discussion was even brought up in 
newspaper editorials, which stated for instance: “Does the SATA committee not want 
discussion?” (Savon Sanomat 27th July 2008) and “There should be public discussion 
about the social security reform” (Helsingin Sanomat 19th July 2008).
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Note: The articles include news articles, editorials, commentary, and letters to editor.
However, lively public discussion emerged in the media in November 2008 (Pulkkinen 
2011: 379; Figure 1). But this public discussion was not caused by the government’s 
above-mentioned official communication activities. Instead, the increase in the number 
of newspaper articles was caused by leaks (see Table 1). A draft memo, prepared by 
the chairman of the committee to facilitate internal discussion in the committee about 
its proposals, was leaked to the news media. Newspapers wrote big headlines on the 
basis of the memo, and this led to a public discussion that lasted for days. One of the 
most heated issues was related to earnings-based social security benefits. Trade unions 
held the view that a policy option mentioned in the leaked memo would weaken these 
benefits. Interviews show that there were severe conflicts inside the committee at the 
time of the leak. The leak can be seen as a consequence of these conflicts. According to 
interviewees, in corporatist bargaining it is very common that heated issues are leaked to 
the press. The leak also affected the official government communication – the commit-
tee arranged a press meeting in November 2008 as a response to the public discussion 
following the above-mentioned leak. 
Vivid public discussion also emerged from January 2009 (Pulkkinen 2011: 37; Figure 1). 
This public discussion was caused by employers’ and employees’ representatives’ agree-
ment on social policy, and the subsequent publication of the SATA committee’s interim 
report. This public discussion was mostly about decisions that had already been agreed 
upon and not so much about issues that were still under negotiation in the committee. 
Publication of the interim report was also preceded by leaks (Table 1), which led to 
many news articles. 
Why then did the government’s official public communication activities not inspire 
vivid public discussion in the media? Answering this question requires taking a closer 
look at the content of the government’s public communication. 
It seems, first of all, that the government presented the goals of the committee quite 
vaguely and in an abstract way in its public communication. For instance, to facilitate 
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agreed upon by the committee members and listed in the committee’s communication 
plan. These core messages included, for example, the goals of “reducing poverty” and 
creating “a supportive and fair social security for everyone.” Thus, the core messages 
were formulated so vaguely and at such a high level of abstraction that almost everyone, 
including all the committee members representing conflicting interests, could agree upon 
them. The formulation of the core messages thus downplayed the controversies inherent 
in the committee’s assignment. For instance, almost no one will argue against the core 
message that poverty should be reduced, but the controversy begins with discussions of 
which part of the population (e.g., the unemployed or elderly people) should be relieved 
from poverty and how. The core messages were used in press releases, ministers’ public 
speeches and the brochure about the reform, for instance in the following manner: “The 
aim of the government’s social security reform is to secure for everyone an extensive 
and reasonable social security, which offers the people better possibilities to control life 
and changes” (Prime Minister’s Office, press release, 7th May 2008). 
Not only goals but also the content of the committee’s work was presented at quite 
a general level. The analysis of the interviews and the public communication material 
shows that, in the press briefings, the committee’s chairman did not reveal in detail 
individual committee members’ positions on different issues. The information given 
to journalists was therefore relatively vague. A telling example is the issue of work 
incentives, which was a controversial issue within the committee. The committee was 
assigned to strengthen work incentives, that is, incentives for unemployed people to seek 
for paid work. This issue was hotly debated in the committee; for instance, trade unions 
fiercely opposed some policy options aimed at reforming earnings-related social security 
in order to strengthen work incentives. However, at the press meetings, the chairman of 
the committee did not reveal the opinions of individual committee members on this issue 
(interviews). Instead, his PowerPoint presentations (5th February 2008; 19th August 2008) 
described at a high level of abstraction that the committee was, for instance, conduct-
ing research on “how the principle of earned income should be included in the criteria 
for paying earnings-related social security benefits” and conducting “an international 
comparison of tax reductions that increase work incentives.” Thus, this controversial 
issue was presented to journalists in an abstract way, not revealing in detail the concrete 
controversies on the committee’s table. 
Evidently, and as already indicated by the low amount of media coverage related to 
the government’s official communication activities, journalists did not consider much 
of the information presented to them as very newsworthy. Given the enormous scope 
and importance of the reform, journalists were interested in it and attended the press 
meetings. However, much of the information presented to journalists in the government’s 
public communication did not seem to have a great deal of news value (Galtung & Ruge 
1965), nor did it fit into the media logic (see Strömbäck & Esser 2009: 212-213): As 
mentioned above, conflicts within the committee were not revealed to journalists in 
detail and they were not personalized. An interviewed committee member understood 
very well that the information given to journalists did not fit into the media logic, as 
individual committee members’ policy positions were not revealed in detail: “[Journal-
ists], of course, would rather want to have a juicy fight than this kind of statement that 
‘we have been developing and calculating and there are different points of views’” 
(committee member). Another interviewed committee member told an anecdote about 
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a journalist who had said to her/him after a press briefing, “next time, if you don’t have 
anything new to say, it’s not worth inviting me”. Some interviewees also suggested that 
journalists mostly wanted to know what the committee would eventually decide, but it 
was not possible to give this kind of information when negotiations were still underway.
However, and as mentioned above, not all of the information provided by official 
government communication activities was totally ignored by journalists. Some news 
articles were written on the basis of these communication activities, but these news ar-
ticles were not usually followed by lively public discussion in the media. For instance, 
one press release informed about the tightening of the schedule of the social security 
reform, and Helsingin Sanomat published a news article on the basis of this press release. 
Not surprisingly, this news about the schedule did not inspire much public discussion. 
In addition, the news articles based on government communication often mentioned the 
committee’s goals (e.g., Aamulehti 8th May 2008; Helsingin Sanomat 8th May 2008), 
echoing the “core messages”. Because the core messages presented the committee’s 
goals at a very general level, thus downplaying their inherently conflictual nature, they 
did not inspire much public discussion either. However, the analysis of news articles 
shows that some concrete policy options were also presented to journalists during the 
press meetings. Concrete policy options (such as a small bonus for unemployed people 
who manage to find a job) were mentioned in some news articles that were based on 
the press meetings. But this did not lead to follow-ups or commentaries in the studied 
newspapers. These policy options were not particularly controversial in comparison to 
some other issues on the committee’s agenda. 
In sum, the information published through official government communication was 
often at quite a general level. Issues the committee was negotiating were often presented 
in ways that did not go into detail concerning the concrete controversies at stake. This 
seems to explain why the official government communication did not result in much 
media coverage and public discussion about the issues under negotiation; the most vis-
ible news articles and vivid public discussions were usually based on leaks or on issues 
already agreed upon by the committee. 
Thus we can conclude that a loose coupling of the government’s public commu-
nication and policy-making occurred. The information published through the official 
government communication activities was to a considerable degree disconnected from 
what was going on in the committee. In other words, links between the government’s 
public communication and private communication among the committee members were 
quite loose: Government communication activities did not enable broad-based public 
discussion about many of the politically sensitive issues that were the subject of the 
most heated discussions within the committee. 
Reasons for Loose Coupling 
The interviews suggest that the vagueness of the government’s public communication 
was related to the need to preserve the efficiency of the bargaining process. Many 
interviewees held the view that extensive public discussion during bargaining should 
be avoided because public discussion tends to fix bargaining positions and thus makes 
compromise-building more difficult (see also Pulkkinen 2011: 80-82). One interviewee, 
for instance, said that “it never helps to achieve the goal of a working group or the like 
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if things go public too early.” On the whole, the civil servants interviewed regarded 
public discussion as more harmful than did the interviewees representing other roles. 
Moreover, the committee members had agreed that the committee’s meetings and draft 
documents were confidential. Confidentiality was justified as a way to preserve the 
“working peace”, and it was seen as a typical feature of corporatist committees (see 
also Vesa & Kananen 2014). 
In order to ensure that public debate would not hamper the consensus-building pro-
cess, politicization of issues was avoided in the official government communication, as 
the analyses of the public communication material already suggest. The press was not 
informed about what the committee members “are fighting about” (interviewed civil 
servant). This means that committee members’ opinions on different issues were not 
revealed in detail, as mentioned above. An interviewed civil servant also noted that it 
was important that the government’s press briefings would not be used to promote or 
oppose any particular policy option. Thus, it is understandable that an interviewed civil 
servant considered it somewhat inevitable that the committee’s work was presented 
at a fairly general level. According to her/him, it was difficult to inform the media in 
any other way than telling “at a slightly more general level” what kind of decision the 
committee is looking for. 
Bargaining-style policy-making thus limited public discussion on the committee’s 
work. Many interviewees felt that extensive public discussion was dangerous and should 
therefore be avoided. Why did the government, then, arrange the public communication 
activities in the first place? 
Many observations suggest that the aim of meeting the demand for transparency was 
one of the most important reasons for arranging the official public communication ac-
tivities. For instance, one interviewed representative of an interest group stated that the 
press briefings were held to “remove suspicions and secretiveness.” An interviewed com-
munication officer said that the briefings were a concrete expression of openness. More 
concretely, one press meeting was a direct response to some journalists’ public demands 
that the committee’s work should be discussed more openly in public (interview). Soon 
after these demands, the Minister of Social Affairs and Health invited journalists to an 
“evening party”. The (draft) invitation letter promised the “possibility of talking about 
the progress of the social security reform and its financing over good food and a sauna.” 
The pressure to arrange the public communication activities was most likely even 
further strengthened by the practice of quantitatively monitoring these activities (cf. 
Erkkilä 2012: 204-207). The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health reports the yearly 
figures on its press meetings and press releases to the Ministry of Finance, which has 
considerable power over the former’s financial resources (cf. Erkkilä 2012). 
However, some of the same interviewees who saw the public communication activi-
ties as a means of meeting the public demand for transparency said at the same time 
that it is important to conduct public communication in such a way that the committee’s 
“working peace” is secured. For instance, while the aforementioned representative of 
an interest group saw the media briefings as a means to increase transparency, she/he 
neglected the possibility of a broad-based and inclusive public debate and participation: 
“I have held the view, that when laws are being made, every citizen cannot participate 
in preparing them.” Another interviewee said that she/he prefers to “have genuine 
discussion in a small group of people” and does not “love big stages” (i.e., public or 
139
Juho Vesa Nordic Openness in Practice
semi-public events). However, she/he added that it would often be wise to use “big 
stages” for various reasons, one being to create “an image that this is somehow very 
democratic and open”.
Thus, there was an apparent paradox in the perceptions of these interviewees: On the 
one hand, the government’s public communication activities were seen as being aimed 
at transparency, while on the other hand, keeping the work of the committee out of the 
public view was considered important to ensuring effective bargaining.10 The vague 
presentation of the committee’s negotiations and goals in public communication was 
apparently a workable solution to this paradox. By referring to vague policy goals and 
talking about the negotiations only at a fairly general level, the government could meet 
the demand for transparency without hampering the bargaining process (cf. Spörer-
Wagner & Marcinkowski 2010: 10). 
Thus, we can conclude that the simultaneous need for secrecy and for meeting trans-
parency demands seems to be one important reason why public communication was 
loosely coupled with policy-making. It seems that the official government communica-
tion to a certain degree served a ceremonial purpose: It gave an appearance of transpar-
ency to strengthen legitimacy. Therefore we can speak of ceremonial transparency. 
Conclusion
The present article has analysed how the government of Finland copes with the strong 
norm of transparency in policy-making. A case study revealed that the government 
struggles to meet transparency demands, but the practices and institutions of consensual 
policy-making can put limits on the transparency of the government communication. 
As a consequence, the demand for transparency is sometimes met only superficially. 
Because policy-makers think that detailed information about policy negotiations cannot 
be published without hampering the bargaining process, government communication 
activities can include ceremonial elements: Such activities may seek to maintain the ap-
pearance of transparency without publishing information that would enable broad-based 
public discussion and effective citizen participation. In these cases, a loose coupling 
of government communication and policy-making occurs, which means that the gov-
ernment’s public communication is to a certain extent disconnected from the ongoing 
policy-making process. This loose coupling is not a sign of a grand conspiracy, but a 
consequence of the practical considerations of government officials who are “muddling 
through”. 
These findings suggest that Nordic openness might be – at least in Finland – partly 
a myth maintained by rituals of government communication. As David Heald (2006: 
34) writes: “Even when transparency appears to be increasing, as measured by some 
index, the reality may be quite different.” However, whether this ceremonial transpar-
ency actually succeeds in enhancing a government’s legitimacy is not certain. If citizens 
become aware of the ceremonial nature of government communication, their trust in the 
government might, on the contrary, decline (cf. Sanders & Canel 2013: 311).
Although the present findings were not intended to be generalized, some remarks 
about generalizability are in order. Due to its nature as a corporatist bargain, the commit-
tee under study can be seen as a most likely case of the loose coupling of policy-making 
with government public communication. Because not all policy-making processes in 
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Finland involve such intensive corporatist bargaining, the findings cannot be generalized 
to all kinds of policy processes. 
The SATA committee can also be seen as an “extreme case” (see Flyvbjerg 2006: 
231), which demonstrates what can happen when a strong norm of transparency meets 
a strong need for secrecy. I believe that this scenario is not only possible in Finnish 
corporatist committees, but also in many other countries and contexts (e.g., see Spörer-
Wagner & Marcinkowski 2010). I hope that the findings presented here can be used 
as a “yardstick” when analysing practices of government openness in future studies in 
similar or different contexts.
Notes
 1. Besides transparency, Nordic openness also refers to the broad participation of civil society actors in pol-
icy-making (see Rainio-Niemi 2014). However, in the present article, I focus on openness understood 
primarily as transparency of government communication. While focusing on transparency instead of 
participation, I understand that these aspects of openness have a “synergistic relationship”, as transpar-
ency is an important prerequisite for participation (Meijer et al. 2012: 14, emphasis in original).
 2. In the article, the term “corporatism” refers to democratic corporatism or neo-corporatism, which is dif-
ferent from authoritarian corporatism (cf. Lijphart 2012: 158). 
 3. The original argument of Meyer and Rowan (1977) is only concerned with loose coupling of (symbolic) 
structures and practices. However, I do not see any reason why the argument could not be extended to 
loose coupling of different practices, as Lowrey and Erzikova (2010) seem to do.
 4. This was not officially the committee’s proposal, but this decision was connected to the work of the 
committee due to an agreement by trade unions and the Confederation of Finnish Industries. 
 5. Nine interviews were conducted by Johannes Kananen and 11 by Juho Vesa. The first nine interviews were 
about the negotiation process, policy ideas and public communication. The last 11 interviews focused 
primarily on public communication. Five committee members were interviewed twice. Some interviewees 
gave later further information by e-mail or telephone. 
 6. I collected the articles of Aamulehti from Suomen Media-arkisto, which I want to thank for co-operation. 
 7. By “semi-public” I mean that participation to these seminars was based on invitation, and the information 
given concerning the SATA committee was not confidential. 
 8. This is true with regard to all studied newspapers, although there are differences in the total number of the 
articles between these papers. As the papers are politically independent, I believe that these differences 
are caused by differences in editorial resources. 
 9. Titta Pulkkinen (2011) counted the monthly numbers of articles about the reform in Aamulehti (AL) and 
Helsingin Sanomat (HS). In November 2008, 23 articles were published in HS, and 15 in AL. In earlier 
months, the number of articles varied between 0 to 8 in HS, and 0 to 7 in AL. 
 10. Esa Reunanen et al. (2010: 303) found a somewhat similar contradiction in the perceptions of members 
of the Finnish power elite.
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